Abstract

 


 



Bicameralism


Jeremy Waldron


New York University School of Law

March 15, 2012

NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-19

Abstract:     
This paper considers the political-theory arguments for bicameralism, both in themselves and in their relation to the present debate in the United Kingdom. It explores Bentham's diatribe against bicameralism and it infers that a justification for bicameralism rests on the significance of the difference(s) between the second chamber and the first. If the second chamber is elected, those differences will be partly a matter of the electoral system, the organization of constituencies, and the rhythm of elections. But perhaps the most important difference lies in the way the second chamber is constituted in its relation to the executive. In a Westminster-style system, the first chamber is ordinarily dominated by the executive. The paper makes a number of suggestions about how this can be avoided in the case of an elected second chamber. In this way the principle of the separation of powers is made relevant to the issue of bicameralism.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: Bentham, bicameralism, constitution, courts, legislative, separation of powers

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Date posted: April 24, 2012 ; Last revised: May 9, 2012

Suggested Citation

Waldron, Jeremy, Bicameralism (March 15, 2012). NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-19. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045646 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2045646

Contact Information

Jeremy Waldron (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
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