Saving Disparate Impact
Chapman University, The Dale E. Fowler School of Law
August 18, 2013
34 Cardozo L. Rev. 2157 (2013)
Chapman University Law Research Paper No. 12-4
More than four decades ago, the Supreme Court concluded that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s prohibition on racial discrimination in employment is properly construed to forbid “practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent,” that nevertheless “operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups . . . that are unrelated to testing job capability.” In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified liability for cases in which an employer “uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the [employer] fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” As many have observed, disparate-impact liability, by forcing employers to justify employment practices that have the effect of excluding women and minorities from their workforce, has been of considerable importance in producing reform in employment practices that had inhibited the economic advance of women and minorities.
Yet, a cloud hangs over disparate-impact liability. In Ricci v. DeStefano, the United States Supreme Court concluded that an employer's decision to discard an employment practice because it produced a racially disparate impact amounts to a form of racial discrimination against nonminorities, at least absent “a strong basis in evidence to believe it would face disparate-impact liability . . . ." By holding that an employer’s abandonment of an employee selection mechanism because it produces too many successful nonminority candidates amounts to racial discrimination, Ricci cast grave constitutional doubt on disparate-impact liability. Contemporary equal protection jurisprudence requires strict scrutiny for all race-conscious governmental action, even when it has a remedial or otherwise ostensibly benign justification. Indeed, in his separate opinion, Justice Scalia expressed serious doubt about the constitutionality of disparate-impact liability.
Ricci has provoked a torrent of criticism from those who regard it as an indefensible limitation on the ability of the civil rights laws to remediate discrimination. The literature does not yet contain, however, an account that endeavors to harmonize disparate-impact liability with contemporary equal protection jurisprudence. The task of this article is to provide that account. Part I demonstrates that the holding in Ricci was essentially compelled by the structure of contemporary equal protection jurisprudence. Part II endeavors to reconcile disparate-impact liability with strict scrutiny. Part III submits that the the fate of disparate-impact liability tells us much about the character of equal protection. Asking the question whether disparate impact can be saved ultimately tells us whether equal protection jurisprudence is to embody a conception of a colorblind Constitution so robust that it effectively prevents the government from addressing racially skewed inequality of opportunity. While it proves difficult to disentangle race-conscious governmental action, even for remedial purposes, from the rigors of strict scrutiny, Part III contends that there is good reason to resist the view that the government must always remain colorblind, even in the face of demonstrable inequality of opportunity that locks racial minorities into a position of economic disadvantage.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 55
Keywords: employment discrimination, equal protection, affirmative action, Ricci v. DeStefano, Title VII, disparate impact
Date posted: April 24, 2012 ; Last revised: August 20, 2013
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.282 seconds