The Government-Sponsored Enterprises and the Mortgage Crisis: The Role of the Affordable Housing Goals
36 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2012 Last revised: 9 May 2012
There are 3 versions of this paper
The Government-Sponsored Enterprises and the Mortgage Crisis: The Role of the Affordable Housing Goals
The Government-Sponsored Enterprises and the Mortgage Crisis: The Role of the Affordable Housing Goals
The Government-Sponsored Enterprises and the Mortgage Crisis: The Role of the Affordable Housing Goals
Date Written: March 22, 2012
Abstract
The U.S. mortgage crisis that began in 2007 generated questions about the role played by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), in its causes. Some have claimed that the Affordable Housing Goals (AHGs), introduced by Congress through the GSE Act of 1992, and the resulting purchases of single-family mortgages the GSEs made to meet those goals, drove lending to high-risk borrowers. Using regression discontinuity analysis, I measure the effect of one of the goals, the Underserved Areas Goal (UAG), on the number of whole single-family mortgages purchased by the GSEs in targeted census tracts from 1996 to 2002. Focusing additionally on tracts that became UAG-eligible in 2005-2006, when the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) began to determine eligibility using the 2000 Census, I measure the effect of the UAG on the GSEs’ whole single-family mortgage purchases during peak years for the subprime mortgage market. Under the first approach, I estimate that the GSEs purchased 0 to 3 percent more goal-eligible mortgages than they would have without the UAG in place. Under the second approach, I estimate this effect to be 2.5 to 5 percent. The results suggest a small UAG effect and challenge the view that the goals caused the GSEs to supply substantially more credit to high-risk borrowers than they otherwise would have supplied. Although the goals may have spurred the GSEs to purchase more multi-family mortgages and REMICs than they otherwise would have, my analyses suggest that the GSEs’ purchases of whole single-family mortgages to satisfy the goals did not drive the subprime lending boom of 2002-2006.
Keywords: GSE, government sponsored enterprises, subprime mortgages, subprime crisis, housing bubble
JEL Classification: G21, G28, I38, L51, R38
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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