Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Forced Open Access: A Two-Sided Model
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law; Munich Center for Innovation and Entrepreneurship Research (MCIER); International Max Planck Research School for Competition and Innovation (IMPRS-CI)
University of Canterbury - Economics and Finance; The Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues (SERCI)
April 25, 2012
TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2012-019
We analyze optimal pricing and quality of a monopolistic journal and the optimality of open access in a two-sided model. The predominant aspect of the model that determines the quality levels at which open access is optimal is the nature of the relationship between readers and authors in a journal. In contrast to previous literature, we firstly show that there exist scenarios in which open access is a feature of high-quality journals. Second, we find that removal of copyright (and thus forced open access) decreases journal profits but has ambiguous social welfare effects.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34
Keywords: academic journal, two-sided market, open access, welfare effects, copyright
JEL Classification: L11, L82, O34working papers series
Date posted: April 26, 2012
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.312 seconds