Content Discrimination Revisited
University of Virginia School of Law
April 26, 2012
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, No. 2, p. 231, 2012
Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2012-29
A central feature of First Amendment law is the prohibition on content discrimination: the government generally may not regulate expression on the basis of the message it communicates. It has become commonplace to say that the Supreme Court’s content-discrimination jurisprudence is deeply incoherent, if not end-determined. This article argues that, in fact, the case law is consistent in its concern and its approach. Its substantive concern is with subject-matter and viewpoint discrimination. Its approach to these forms of discrimination, for better or worse, strongly echoes the Supreme Court’s approach to invidious purpose in the Equal Protection context. Recognizing this underlying pattern points the way toward a clearer normative evaluation of the content-discrimination principle.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 71
Keywords: First Amendment, free speech, freedom of expression, content discrimination, content neutralityAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: April 26, 2012 ; Last revised: April 28, 2012
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