Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2046832
 
 

Footnotes (257)



 


 



How Much is an Ambassadorship? And the Tale of How Watergate Led to a Strong Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and a Weak Federal Election Campaign Act


Ciara Torres-Spelliscy


Stetson University - College of Law

April 26, 2012

Chapman Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2012

Abstract:     
When White House Counsel John Dean infamously told President Richard Milhous Nixon that there was a “cancer on the presidency,” and that more hush money would be needed to keep the cover-up of the Watergate break-in secret, Nixon responded without much hesitation that he knew where he could get a million dollars in cash. The President was used to having vast resources at his fingertips because of the millions flowing through his campaign committees. Historians now know that much of the money flowing through those committees was from illegal sources.

This essay is a synopsis that illegal money and two of the reforms it inspired: the Federal Election Campaign Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. This piece will argue that the scale of post-Watergate reforms were justified by the magnitude of quid pro quo corruption in the Nixon White House. This essay will also argue that in 2012, in this post-Citizens United environment, Congress should take a similar approach and embrace both campaign finance reforms as well securities law reforms to ensure the integrity of our democratic processes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: FECA, FCPA, campaign finance, money in politics, quid pro quo, corruption, Watergate, bribery, rule of law, SEC, DOJ, shareholder, investor, corporate political activity, laundering

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 28, 2012 ; Last revised: July 18, 2012

Suggested Citation

Torres-Spelliscy, Ciara, How Much is an Ambassadorship? And the Tale of How Watergate Led to a Strong Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and a Weak Federal Election Campaign Act (April 26, 2012). Chapman Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2046832 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2046832

Contact Information

Ciara Torres-Spelliscy (Contact Author)
Stetson University - College of Law ( email )
1401 61st Street South
Gulfport, FL 33707
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,130
Downloads: 114
Download Rank: 141,457
Footnotes:  257

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.359 seconds