Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2047433
 


 



Does Tort Reform Affect Physician Supply? Evidence from Texas


David A. Hyman


University of Illinois College of Law

Charles Silver


University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Bernard S. Black


Northwestern University - School of Law; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Myungho Paik


Hanyang University - College of Policy Sciences

February 14, 2014

nearly final version, published in International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 42, 2015, pp. 203-218
Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper 12-11
Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS12-12
U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 225

Abstract:     
Does state tort reform affect physician supply? Tort reformers certainly believe so. Before Texas adopted tort reform in 2003, proponents claimed that physicians were deserting Texas in droves. After tort reform was enacted, proponents claimed there had been a dramatic increase in physicians moving to Texas due to the improved liability climate. We find no evidence to support either claim. Physician supply was not measurably stunted prior to reform, and it did not measurably improve after reform. This is true for all patient care physicians in Texas, high-malpractice-risk specialties, primary care physicians, and rural physicians.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: physician supply, malpractice, tort reform


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Date posted: April 30, 2012 ; Last revised: May 23, 2015

Suggested Citation

Hyman, David A. and Silver, Charles and Black, Bernard S. and Paik, Myungho, Does Tort Reform Affect Physician Supply? Evidence from Texas (February 14, 2014). nearly final version, published in International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 42, 2015, pp. 203-218; Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper 12-11; Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS12-12; U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 225. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2047433 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2047433

Contact Information

David A. Hyman
University of Illinois College of Law ( email )
504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
Charles M. Silver
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law ( email )
727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States
512-232-1337 (Phone)
512-232-1372 (Fax)
Bernard S. Black (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
512-503-2784 (Phone)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-5049 (Phone)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Brussels
Belgium
Myungho Paik
Hanyang University - College of Policy Sciences ( email )
222 Wangsimni-ro Seongdong-gu
Seoul, 133-791
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)
Feedback to SSRN


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