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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2048235
 
 

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Entrepreneurial Commercialization Choices and the Interaction between IPR and Competition Policy


Lars Persson


Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Joshua S. Gans


University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; NBER

January 2, 2012

IFN Working Paper No. 895

Abstract:     
This paper examines the interaction between intellectual property protection and competition policy on the choice of entrepreneurs with respect to commercialization as well as the rate of innovation. We find that stronger intellectual property protection makes it more likely that entrepreneurs will commercialize by cooperating with incumbents rather than competing with them. Consequently, we demonstrate that competition policy has a clearer role in promoting a higher rate of innovation in that event. Hence, we identify one reason why the strength of the two policies may be complements from the perspective of increasing the rate of entrepreneurial innovation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: entrepreneurs, innovation, commercialization, intellectual property law, competition law

JEL Classification: O31

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Date posted: April 30, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Persson, Lars and Gans, Joshua S., Entrepreneurial Commercialization Choices and the Interaction between IPR and Competition Policy (January 2, 2012). IFN Working Paper No. 895. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2048235 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2048235

Contact Information

Lars Persson (Contact Author)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )
Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Joshua S. Gans
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://www.joshuagans.com

NBER ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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