Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=204872
 
 

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Agency Models in Law and Economics


Eric A. Posner


University of Chicago - Law School

2000

University of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 92

Abstract:     
This lecture is an introduction to the use of agency models in law and economics. It is designed for first year law students with no background in economics. A simple example is used to illustrate the basic tradeoff between incentives and insurance when a principal is unable to observe an agent's level of effort. The example is then generalized, and several complications (multitasking, multiple agents, teams, etc.) are discussed. The agency model is then used to analyze contract remedies, and (very briefly) issues in torts, corporations, civil procedure, administrative procedure, and other important areas of the law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

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Date posted: January 18, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Posner, Eric A., Agency Models in Law and Economics (2000). University of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 92. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=204872 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.204872

Contact Information

Eric A. Posner (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/
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