Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=204889
 
 

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Some Observations Concerning Multi-Jurisdictional Tax Competition


Daniel Shaviro


New York University School of Law

undated


Abstract:     
Should (or when should) separate governments, including sub-units in a federal system, be encouraged to engage in tax competition rather than harmonizing their tax systems? The question is akin to asking when government should be used to solve collective action problems through coercion, and thus has no uniform answer. The paper discusses tariff examples where harmonization is preferable, Tiebout examples where competition is preferable, and then assesses the collision of these two lines of analysis with respect to tax haven and holiday jurisdictions that offer outside businesses or passive investors more favorable tax terms than those available to the locals.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

JEL Classification: H00, H25, H41, H71, H73, H87, K34

working papers series





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Date posted: February 8, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Shaviro, Daniel, Some Observations Concerning Multi-Jurisdictional Tax Competition (undated). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=204889 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.204889

Contact Information

Daniel Shaviro (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
Room 314-B
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6187 (Phone)
212-995-4341 (Fax)
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