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The Questionable Basis of the Common European Sales Law: The Role of an Optional Instrument in Jurisdictional CompetitionEric A. PosnerUniversity of Chicago - Law School May 1, 2012 University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 597 Abstract: The Common European Sales Law is designed as an optional instrument that European parties engaged in cross-border transactions could choose for their transactions in preference to national law. The goal is to increase cross-border transactions and perhaps to enhance European identity. But the CESL is unlikely to achieve these goals. It raises transaction costs while producing few if any benefits; it is unlikely to spur beneficial jurisdictional competition; its consumer protection provisions will make it unattractive for businesses; and its impact on European identity is likely to be small.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 15 working papers seriesDate posted: May 2, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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