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The Questionable Basis of the Common European Sales Law: The Role of an Optional Instrument in Jurisdictional Competition


Eric A. Posner


University of Chicago - Law School

May 1, 2012

University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 597

Abstract:     
The Common European Sales Law is designed as an optional instrument that European parties engaged in cross-border transactions could choose for their transactions in preference to national law. The goal is to increase cross-border transactions and perhaps to enhance European identity. But the CESL is unlikely to achieve these goals. It raises transaction costs while producing few if any benefits; it is unlikely to spur beneficial jurisdictional competition; its consumer protection provisions will make it unattractive for businesses; and its impact on European identity is likely to be small.

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Date posted: May 2, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Posner, Eric A., The Questionable Basis of the Common European Sales Law: The Role of an Optional Instrument in Jurisdictional Competition (May 1, 2012). University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 597. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2049594 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2049594

Contact Information

Eric A. Posner (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/
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