Balancing Hazards and the Design of Local Franchise Contracts
Indiana University - Purdue University Indianapolis
Craig R. Smith
University of Arizona
May 1, 2012
Malatesta, Deanna and Craig R. Smith. (in press). Balancing hazards and the design of local franchise contracts” Urban Affairs Review, Forthcoming
Relying on transaction cost logic we consider the likelihood that contract duration and monitoring are jointly determined in 241 cable franchise renewal agreements. Results indicate that municipalities award longer contracts to larger cable companies with more asset specific investments, but also more actively monitor these contracts. In addition, performance problems in the initial period lead municipalities to choose more active monitoring going forward. Our findings have implications for understanding the way contract options are combined to address various hazards but also for contracting officers who want to make reasoned decisions regarding the use of incentives, controls, rewards, and sanctions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34
Keywords: cable TV franchising, contract design, contract hazards, contract incentives, duration, monitoring
JEL Classification: L14, L12, L96Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 2, 2012
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