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Regulating by Repute

David T. Zaring

University of Pennsylvania - Legal Studies Department

May 3, 2012

Michigan Law Review, Vol. 110, No. 6, p. 1003, 2012

This review essay evaluates Daniel Carpenter’s theory that the Food and Drug Administration’s successful history is largely due to its strong reputation. Reputation is an increasingly popular explanation for legal compliance when a tally of the more immediate and tangible costs and benefits would suggest that noncompliance or shirking would be the more rational choice, and evaluating the way Carpenter explores reputation’s important to the FDA allows for a broader consideration of its role in regulatory projects more generally. Moreover, by delving into what the agency did once it was given the authority to permit or reject the sale of drugs in the American market, Carpenter offers an account of what happens in agencies after administrative law stops its usual inquiry – or, at least, after it did so in the case of the FDA. The essay explores the implications of that “ordinary governance” for the usual focuses of legal scholarship.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

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Date posted: May 3, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Zaring, David T., Regulating by Repute (May 3, 2012). Michigan Law Review, Vol. 110, No. 6, p. 1003, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2050595

Contact Information

David T. Zaring (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Legal Studies Department ( email )
3730 Walnut Street
Suite 600
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

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