Abstract

 


 



Analyst Interest, Market Visibility, and Stock Returns


Michael J. Jung


New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; New York University (NYU) - Department of Accounting, Taxation & Business Law

M.H. Franco Wong


INSEAD; University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Frank Zhang


Yale School of Management

May 4, 2012


Abstract:     
Economic theory suggests that market visibility–the extent to which market participants are informed about a firm – affects the cost of capital and firm value. Recent empirical evidence supports the theory and even suggests visibility explains stock returns more than firm fundamentals. In this study, we use analyst interest – the number of analysts who participate on a firm’s earnings conference call – as an early indicator of a firm’s overall market visibility. We show that changes in analyst interest from the prior quarter predict future changes in analyst coverage, future changes in institutional ownership, and future trading volume. We also show that changes in analyst interest are positively correlated with future stock returns. Cross sectional analyses indicate that the marginal effect of analyst interest is strongest for low visibility firms. As our measure predicts commonly-used market visibility proxies and future stock returns, it offers a one-step-ahead advantage in analyzing stock market dynamics.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: analyst interest, market visibility, investor recognition, cost of capital, stock return

JEL Classification: G11, G12, G14, G31, M41

working papers series


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Date posted: May 5, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Jung, Michael J., Wong, M.H. Franco and Zhang, Frank, Analyst Interest, Market Visibility, and Stock Returns (May 4, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2050972 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2050972

Contact Information

Michael J. Jung
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
212-998-0193 (Phone)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Accounting, Taxation & Business Law
40 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
M.H. Franco Wong
INSEAD ( email )
Boulevard de Constance
77305 Fontainebleau
France
+33 (0)1 60 72 92 45 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/faculty/profiles/fwong/

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )
105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6
Canada
416-946-0729 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/facbios/viewFac.asp?facultyID=Franco.Wong
Frank Zhang (Contact Author)
Yale School of Management ( email )
135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

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