Abstract

 
 

References (47)



 


 



Venture Capitalists in Mature Public Firms


Ugur Celikyurt


Koc University - College of Administrative Sciences and Economics

Merih Sevilir


Indiana University - Kelley School of Business

Anil Shivdasani


University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School

May 5, 2012

UNC Kenan-Flagler Research Paper No. 2013-4

Abstract:     
Using data on the backgrounds of board members of S&P companies, we show that venture capitalists (VCs) play an important role in mature public firms long after their initial public offering (IPO). Almost one-third of mature public companies have at least one VC director on their board. VC presence on the board is not limited to mature companies that were VC-backed at the time of their IPO – over one-third of mature firms with VC directors were not VC-backed at the time of their IPO. Appointments of VC directors to the board are followed by increases in R&D intensity, innovation output, and greater deal activity with other VC-backed firms. VC director appointments are associated with positive announcement returns and are followed by an improvement in operating performance. Finally, firms experience higher announcement returns from acquisitions of VC-backed targets following the appointment of a VC director to the board. Our results show that in addition to their function as providers of finance, monitoring and advice for small private firms, VCs play a significant role in mature public firms as well. Hence, we illustrate a much broader role for VCs than has been established in the literature.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 69

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: May 6, 2012 ; Last revised: January 15, 2013

Suggested Citation

Celikyurt, Ugur, Sevilir, Merih and Shivdasani, Anil, Venture Capitalists in Mature Public Firms (May 5, 2012). UNC Kenan-Flagler Research Paper No. 2013-4. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2051522 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2051522

Contact Information

Ugur Celikyurt
Koc University - College of Administrative Sciences and Economics ( email )
Rumelifeneri Yolu
Sariyer 80910, Istanbul
Turkey
Merih Sevilir
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business ( email )
IN 47405
United States
Anil Shivdasani (Contact Author)
University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School ( email )
Kenan-Flagler Business School
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States
919-962-3182 (Phone)
919-962-2068 (Fax)

Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 723
Downloads: 135
Download Rank: 107,343
References:  47
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.531 seconds