Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2054068
 
 

References (42)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Legislators V. Regulators: The Case of Low Power FM Radio


Thomas W. Hazlett


George Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law

Bruno E. Viani


Nathan Associates; CENTRUM-Pontifical Catholic University of Peru

July 28, 2003

TPRC 2003

Abstract:     
The Federal Communications Commission rule making for low-power FM radio was widely reported as an instance where Congress sharply rebuked a regulatory agency for enacting rules too favorable to entrants. Because rival policy optima are quantifiable in this case, the preferences of Congress and the Commission can be directly evaluated. While policy differences between Congress and the regulatory agency were visible to interest groups, they signified a negligible increment when compared to the efficient policy solution. A financial event study supports this interpretation, as radio broadcasters’ equity values were not materially affected by the competitive entry envisioned by the Commission. This suggests that reportedly sharp differences between Congressional and agency political preferences can be trivial in economic terms, as predicted by the Congressional Dominance view of regulation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: May 10, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Hazlett, Thomas W. and Viani, Bruno E., Legislators V. Regulators: The Case of Low Power FM Radio (July 28, 2003). TPRC 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2054068

Contact Information

Thomas W. Hazlett (Contact Author)
George Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law ( email )
George Mason School of Law
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-4244 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~thazlett/

George Mason Law School Logo

Bruno E. Viani
Nathan Associates ( email )
2101 wilson Blvd
ste 1200
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
CENTRUM-Pontifical Catholic University of Peru ( email )
Alomía Robles 125
Lima, Lima 33
Peru
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 142
Downloads: 2
References:  42
Citations:  2
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.406 seconds