Abstract

 


 



Zero-Interest Rate Policy and Unintended Consequences in Emerging Markets


Andreas Hoffmann


University of Leipzig - Institute for Economic Policy

July 25, 2012


Abstract:     
In response to the subprime crisis and Great Recession central banks in advanced economies have cut interest rates towards zero and increased monetary accommodation to step-up domestic growth. In this paper I attempt to describe the unintended consequences of the low interest rate policies in emerging markets. I argue based on the Mises-Hayek business cycle theory that the current low interest rate policy in advanced economies may have planted the seeds for new bubbles and gave rise to interventionist cycles in emerging markets. I show that capital flows to high-yielding emerging markets translate into monetary expansion in emerging markets. In the face of buoyant capital inflows fear of floating forces emerging markets to follow the interest rate policy of advanced economies. The monetary expansion triggers mal-investment and over-borrowing. To stem against arising inflationary pressure and kill-off speculative capital inflows empirical evidence suggests that emerging market governments increasingly repress financial markets. International financial markets disintegrate. I conclude that the monetary policy of the large advanced economies is incompatible with financial integration and globalization.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: Monetary Policy, Emerging Markets, Capital Controls, De-Globalization, Mises-Hayek

JEL Classification: B53, E32, E44, F41, F43

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Date posted: May 12, 2012 ; Last revised: September 2, 2012

Suggested Citation

Hoffmann, Andreas, Zero-Interest Rate Policy and Unintended Consequences in Emerging Markets (July 25, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2055690 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2055690

Contact Information

Andreas Hoffmann (Contact Author)
University of Leipzig - Institute for Economic Policy ( email )
Institute for Economic Policy
Grimmaische Str. 12
Leipzig, 04109
Germany
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