Abstract

 


 



Belief-Free Price Formation


Stefano Lovo


HEC Paris - Finance Department

Tristan Tomala


HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences

Johannes Horner


Yale University - Cowles Foundation

May 9, 2012

Paris December 2012 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI-AFFI Paper

Abstract:     
We analyze security price formation in a dynamic setting in which long-lived dealers repeatedly compete for trading with potentially informed retail traders. For a class of market microstructure models, we characterize equilibria in which dealers’ dynamic pricing strategies are optimal no matter the private information that each dealer has about the economy fundamentals. In a generalization of the Glosten and Milgrom model, these equilibria generate price dynamics that are reminiscent of well known stylized facts: price/trading-flow correlation, volatility clustering, price bubble and inventory/inter-dealer trading correlation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: Financial Market Microstructure, Belief-free Equilibria, Informed Market Makers, Price Volatility

JEL Classification: G1, G12, C72, C73

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Date posted: May 14, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Lovo, Stefano, Tomala, Tristan and Horner, Johannes, Belief-Free Price Formation (May 9, 2012). Paris December 2012 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI-AFFI Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2057035 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2057035

Contact Information

Stefano Lovo (Contact Author)
HEC Paris (Groupe HEC) - Finance Department ( email )
1 rue de la Liberation
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France
Tristan Tomala
HEC Paris (Groupe HEC) - Economics & Decision Sciences ( email )
1 rue de la Liberation
Paris, 78351
France

Johannes Horner
Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )
Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

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