Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2057299
 


 



Human Trafficking and Regulating Prostitution


Samuel Lee


New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Petra Persson


Stanford University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

December 13, 2013

IFN Working Paper No. 996
NYU Stern School of Business EC-12-07
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-08

Abstract:     
We study human trafficking in a marriage market model of prostitution. When trafficking is based on coercion, trafficking victims constitute a non-zero share of supply in any unregulated prostitution market. We ask if regulation can eradicate trafficking and restore the outcome that would arise in an unregulated market without traffickers. All existing approaches – criminalization of prostitutes (“the traditional model”), licensed prostitution (“the Dutch model”), and criminalization of johns (“the Swedish model”) – fail to accomplish this goal, but we show that there exists an alternative regulatory model that does. Political support for regulation hinges on the level of gender income inequality.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: Prostitution, trafficking, contemporary slavery, marriage, illegal goods

JEL Classification: D10, J16, J47, J49, K14, K23


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Date posted: May 14, 2012 ; Last revised: January 9, 2015

Suggested Citation

Lee, Samuel and Persson, Petra, Human Trafficking and Regulating Prostitution (December 13, 2013). IFN Working Paper No. 996; NYU Stern School of Business EC-12-07; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-08. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2057299 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2057299

Contact Information

Samuel Lee (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) ( email )
579 Serra Mall at Galvez St.
Stanford, CA 94305-6015
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Petra Persson
Stanford University ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )
Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden
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