Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2057299
 


 



Human Trafficking and Regulating Prostitution


Samuel Lee


Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Petra Persson


Stanford University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

November 29, 2015

IFN Working Paper No. 996
NYU Stern School of Business EC-12-07
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-08

Abstract:     
We model a semi-coerced market for sex with voluntary prostitutes and trafficking. Trafficking victims generally constitute a non-zero share of supply in a decriminalized market. We analyze whether prostitution laws can restore the socially optimal outcome that would arise in a decriminalized market free from trafficking. No regulatory regime currently used in practice accomplishes this goal, but a novel policy, which combines the “Dutch” and “Swedish” regimes, would. Our analysis offers guidance for empirical studies on the impact of prostitution laws, and is pertinent to the debate on decriminalization of prostitution.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Prostitution, trafficking, contemporary slavery, illegal goods, organ market

JEL Classification: D10, J16, J47, J49, K14, K23


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Date posted: May 14, 2012 ; Last revised: November 30, 2015

Suggested Citation

Lee, Samuel and Persson, Petra, Human Trafficking and Regulating Prostitution (November 29, 2015). IFN Working Paper No. 996; NYU Stern School of Business EC-12-07; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-08. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2057299 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2057299

Contact Information

Samuel Lee (Contact Author)
Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business
500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA California 95053
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Petra Persson
Stanford University ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )
Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden
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