Abstract

 


 



Human Trafficking and Regulating Prostitution


Samuel Lee


New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Petra Persson


Columbia University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

July 11, 2012

NYU Stern School of Business EC-12-07
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-08

Abstract:     
The effect of prostitution laws on human trafficking and voluntary prostitution is subject to debate. We argue theoretically that neither legalization nor criminalization can simultaneously protect voluntary prostitutes and unambiguously reduce trafficking. We propose a novel, “hybrid” policy that achieves both objectives and restores the free market outcome that arises in the absence of trafficking. If a regulator aims to eradicate all prostitution instead, the optimal policy criminalizes all johns. Criminalizing prostitutes is ineffective and unjust because it fails to eradicate trafficking and penalizes victims. We consider cross-border trafficking, sex tourism, social norms, and political support for prostitution laws. The model predicts that the female-male income ratio is a key determinant of what share of prostitutes is trafficked, the consequences of prostitution laws, and the political will to enact or enforce them.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: Prostitution, sex trafficking, contemporary slavery, marriage, criminalization

JEL Classification: D10, J16, J47, J49, K14, K23

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Date posted: May 14, 2012 ; Last revised: August 5, 2012

Suggested Citation

Lee, Samuel and Persson, Petra, Human Trafficking and Regulating Prostitution (July 11, 2012). NYU Stern School of Business EC-12-07; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-08. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2057299 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2057299

Contact Information

Samuel Lee (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Petra Persson
Columbia University ( email )
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )
Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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