Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2057607
 


 



Trustworthy by Convention


Maria Bigoni


University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Stefania Bortolotti


University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Marco Casari


University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Diego Gambetta


University of Oxford

May 14, 2012

Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 827

Abstract:     
Social life offers innumerable instances in which trust relations involve multiple agents. In an experiment, we study a new setting called Collective Trust Game where there are multiple trustees, who may have an incentive to coordinate their actions. Trustworthiness has also a strategic motivation, and the trusters' decision depends upon their beliefs about the predominant convention with regard to trustworthiness. In this respect, the Collective Trust Games offers a richer pattern of behavior than dyadic games. We report that the levels of trustworthiness are almost thirty percentage points higher when strategic motivations are present rather than not. Higher levels of trustworthiness also led to higher levels of trust. Moreover, strategic motives appear as a major drive for trustees, comparable in size to positive reciprocity, and more important than concerns for equality.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: trust game, coordination, inequality aversion, reciprocity, experiments

JEL Classification: C92, C72, D03

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Date posted: May 14, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Bigoni, Maria and Bortolotti, Stefania and Casari, Marco and Gambetta, Diego, Trustworthy by Convention (May 14, 2012). Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 827. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2057607 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2057607

Contact Information

Maria Bigoni (Contact Author)
University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, Bologna 40126
Italy
+390512098122 (Phone)
Stefania Bortolotti
University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )
Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy
Marco Casari
University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )
Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy
Diego Gambetta
University of Oxford ( email )
Mansfield Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 4AU
United Kingdom
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