A Market for Connections
Stockholm School of Economics - Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich - Faculty of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) - Ifo Institute for Economic Research; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
May 15, 2012
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3810
Government or company decisions on whom to hire are mostly delegated to politicians, public sector officials or human resources and procurement managers. Due to anti-corruption laws, agents cannot sell contracts or positions that they are delegated to decide upon. Even if bribing is ruled out, those interested in the spoils may invest in a good relationship with the deciding agents in order to be remembered when the nomination is made. In this paper, we analyze such markets for connections in the presence of convex costs of networking.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34
Keywords: nominations, rent-seeking, networks, politicians, procurement
JEL Classification: C790, D520, D720, D850, H570, L140working papers series
Date posted: May 15, 2012
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.484 seconds