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The Composition of International Capital Flows: Risk Sharing Through Foreign Direct Investment


Rui A. Albuquerque


Boston University - School of Management; Católica-Lisbon School of Business and Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

August 30, 2000

Simon School of Business Working Paper No. FR 00-08

Abstract:     
Evidence on international capital flows suggests that (i) foreign direct investment is less volatile than other financial flows, and that (ii) countries with lower financial ratings--and less developed countries--receive larger shares of FDI flows. We rationalize these facts in a model where international capital flows are subject to imperfect enforcement and FDI is inalienable. Inalienability means that it is not as advantageous to expropriate FDI relative to other flows. This leads to a relatively lower default premium on FDI. Hence, a financially constrained country borrows relatively more through FDI. Simultaneously, non-FDI flows respond more aggressively to changes in the country's financial constraint. The inalienability of FDI highlights its risk sharing potential.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

JEL Classification: F21, F34, F36

working papers series


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Date posted: February 18, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Albuquerque, Rui A., The Composition of International Capital Flows: Risk Sharing Through Foreign Direct Investment (August 30, 2000). Simon School of Business Working Paper No. FR 00-08. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=206071 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.206071

Contact Information

Rui A. Albuquerque (Contact Author)
Boston University - School of Management ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
HOME PAGE: http://people.bu.edu/ralbuque/
Católica-Lisbon School of Business and Economics ( email )
Caminho da Palma de Cima
Lisbon, 1649-023
Portugal
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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