Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2060822
 
 

References (19)



 
 

Citations (5)



 
 

Footnotes (10)



 


 



Externality‐Correcting Taxes and Regulation


Vidar Christiansen


University of Oslo - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Stephen Smithson


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

June 2012

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, Issue 2, pp. 358-383, 2012

Abstract:     
In much of the literature on externalities, taxes and direct regulation have been considered as alternative policy instruments. Both instruments might be imperfect in practice, reflecting informational deficiencies and other limitations. We analyse the use of taxes and regulation in combination, to control externalities arising from individual consumption behaviour. We consider the cases either where taxes are imperfectly differentiated to reflect individual differences in externalities, or where some consumption escapes taxation. In both cases, we characterize the optimal instrument mix, and we show how changing the level of direct regulation alters the optimal externality tax.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: Consumption externalities, imperfect policy instruments, Pigouvian taxes

JEL Classification: H21, H23

Accepted Paper Series





Date posted: May 16, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Christiansen, Vidar and Smithson, Stephen, Externality‐Correcting Taxes and Regulation (June 2012). The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, Issue 2, pp. 358-383, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2060822 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01701.x

Contact Information

Vidar Christiansen (Contact Author)
University of Oslo - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 1095 Blindern
N-0317 Oslo
Norway
011-47-22-855121 (Phone)
011-47-22-855035 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Stephen Smithson
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0) 20 7955 7647 (Phone)
+44 (0) 20 7955 7385 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://is.lse.ac.uk/staff/smithson/
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References:  19
Citations:  5
Footnotes:  10

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