Abstract

 


 



Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law


Oren Bar-Gill


New York University School of Law

Omri Ben-Shahar


University of Chicago Law School

May 1, 2012

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-12
University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 598

Abstract:     
This Article classifies the consumer protection techniques that European contract law employs into four categories: Mandatory arrangements; disclosure; regulation of entry to and exit from contracts; and pro-buyer default rules and contract interpretation. It argues that these techniques are far less likely to succeed than advocates, including the European Commission, believe, and that they may bring about unintended consequences and hurt consumers. The techniques and their limits are illustrated through a study of the proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL). The Article argues that the ambitious pursuit of consumer protection goals is also likely to interfere with the other main goals of European contract law: harmonizing the laws of member states, encouraging cross border trade, and improving consumers’ access to markets.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

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Date posted: May 16, 2012 ; Last revised: June 13, 2012

Suggested Citation

Bar-Gill, Oren and Ben-Shahar, Omri, Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law (May 1, 2012). NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-12; University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 598. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061148 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2061148

Contact Information

Oren Bar-Gill
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6222 (Phone)
212-995-4590 (Fax)
Omri Ben-Shahar (Contact Author)
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
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