Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061148
 


 



Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law


Oren Bar-Gill


Harvard Law School

Omri Ben-Shahar


University of Chicago Law School

June 1, 2012

Common Market Law Review, Vol. 50, p. 109, 2013
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-12
University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 598

Abstract:     
This Article classifies the consumer protection techniques that European contract law employs into four categories: Mandatory arrangements; disclosure; regulation of entry to and exit from contracts; and pro-buyer default rules and contract interpretation. It argues that these techniques are far less likely to succeed than advocates, including the European Commission, believe, and that they may bring about unintended consequences and hurt consumers. The techniques and their limits are illustrated through a study of the proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL). The Article argues that the ambitious pursuit of consumer protection goals is also likely to interfere with the other main goals of European contract law: harmonizing the laws of member states, encouraging cross border trade, and improving consumers’ access to markets.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: May 16, 2012 ; Last revised: July 13, 2013

Suggested Citation

Bar-Gill, Oren and Ben-Shahar, Omri, Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law (June 1, 2012). Common Market Law Review, Vol. 50, p. 109, 2013; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-12; University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 598. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061148 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2061148

Contact Information

Oren Bar-Gill
Harvard Law School
1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Omri Ben-Shahar (Contact Author)
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,194
Downloads: 768
Download Rank: 17,019

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.437 seconds