Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis
William H. Page
University of Florida - Fredric G. Levin College of Law
May 17, 2012
Antitrust remedies -- criminal and civil, public and private, penalties and injunctions -- are supposed to “eliminate the effects of the illegal conduct” and “restore competition.” In pursuing these goals, courts and enforcers are guided by the standard of economic efficiency and by certain assumptions about the relative capabilities of markets and regulators. A substantial literature now examines the optimal use of antitrust remedies in specific contexts or for specific offenses to achieve economic efficiency. In this essay, I draw on these studies to develop an integrated, albeit schematic, account of how courts and agencies might optimally deploy the various remedies to deter or enjoin collusive and exclusionary practices.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46
Keywords: antitrust, optimal deterrence, antitrust damages, injunctions, criminal penalties
JEL Classification: K21, K42, L40, L41working papers series
Date posted: May 17, 2012 ; Last revised: July 29, 2012
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.454 seconds