Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061791
 


 



Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis


William H. Page


University of Florida - Fredric G. Levin College of Law

May 17, 2012


Abstract:     
Antitrust remedies -- criminal and civil, public and private, penalties and injunctions -- are supposed to “eliminate the effects of the illegal conduct” and “restore competition.” In pursuing these goals, courts and enforcers are guided by the standard of economic efficiency and by certain assumptions about the relative capabilities of markets and regulators. A substantial literature now examines the optimal use of antitrust remedies in specific contexts or for specific offenses to achieve economic efficiency. In this essay, I draw on these studies to develop an integrated, albeit schematic, account of how courts and agencies might optimally deploy the various remedies to deter or enjoin collusive and exclusionary practices.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: antitrust, optimal deterrence, antitrust damages, injunctions, criminal penalties

JEL Classification: K21, K42, L40, L41

working papers series


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Date posted: May 17, 2012 ; Last revised: July 29, 2012

Suggested Citation

Page, William H., Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis (May 17, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061791 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2061791

Contact Information

William Hepburn Page (Contact Author)
University of Florida - Fredric G. Levin College of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
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