Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061844
 


 



The OECD's Proposal to Cartelize Mexican Telecommunications


Gregory Sidak


Criterion Economics, L.L.C.

May 21, 2012


Abstract:     
The OECD’s proposed regime of asymmetric ex ante regulation for Mexico’s telecommunications marketplace would reduce competition, contrary to the OECD’s aims. The OECD’s proposals would harm Mexican consumers and force an increase in prices paid for telecommunications services. They would create a government-sanctioned price cartel among the telecommunications providers. They would reward inefficient competitors and penalize efficient carriers, all to the detriment of the consumers. Instead of relying on new layers of counterproductive or ineffective regulations, the Mexican government should remove regulatory entry barriers between video and telephone, thereby creating enduring, facilities-based competition.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Antitrust, Telecommunications, Regulation, Competition, Network, America Movil, Consumer welfare

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Date posted: May 17, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Sidak, Gregory, The OECD's Proposal to Cartelize Mexican Telecommunications (May 21, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061844 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2061844

Contact Information

J. Gregory Sidak (Contact Author)
Criterion Economics, L.L.C. ( email )
1717 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
United States
(202) 518-5121 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.criterioneconomics.com
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