Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=206189
 
 

Citations (84)



 


 



Sequential Innovation, Patents, And Imitation


James E. Bessen


Boston University - School of Law; Research on Innovation

Eric Maskin


Princeton University - Department of Economics; Harvard University - Department of Economics; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

January 2000

MIT Dept. of Economics Working Paper No. 00-01

Abstract:     
How could such industries as software, semiconductors, and computers have been so innovative despite historically weak patent protection? We argue that if innovation is both sequential and complementary--as it certainly has been in those industries--competition can increase firms' future profits thus offsetting short-term dissipation of rents. A simple model also shows that in such a dynamic industry, patent protection may reduce overall innovation and social welfare. The natural experiment that occurred when patent protection was extended to software in the 1980?s provides a test of this model. Standard arguments would predict that R&D intensity and productivity should have increased among patenting firms. Consistent with our model, however, these increases did not occur. Other evidence supporting our model includes a distinctive pattern of cross-licensing in these industries and a positive relationship between rates of innovation and firm entry.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

JEL Classification: O31, O34

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: February 9, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Bessen, James E. and Maskin, Eric, Sequential Innovation, Patents, And Imitation (January 2000). MIT Dept. of Economics Working Paper No. 00-01. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=206189 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.206189

Contact Information

James E. Bessen (Contact Author)
Boston University - School of Law ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
Research on Innovation ( email )
202 High Head Rd.
Harpswell, ME 04079
United States
617-531-2092 (Phone)
Eric S. Maskin
Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )
Institute for Advanced Study
Einstein Drive West Building Room 318
Princeton, NJ 08540
United States
(609) 734-8309 (Phone)
(609) 951-4457 (Fax)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(617) 495-4167 (Phone)
(617) 495-7730 (Fax)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics
50 Memorial Drive
E52-391
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 13,136
Downloads: 2,295
Download Rank: 2,754
Citations:  84
People who downloaded this paper also downloaded:
1. The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes
By James Bessen and Michael Meurer

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.422 seconds