Abstract

 


 



Strict Liability Versus Negligence


Hans-Bernd Schäfer


Bucerius Law School; University of Hamburg

Frank Mueller-Langer


Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law; International Max Planck Research School for Competition and Innovation (IMPRS-CI)

2008


Abstract:     
The purpose of this chapter is to compare negligence rules and strict liability rules and to examine the allocative effects resulting from the application of different liability regimes. It first discusses unilateral accidents, while the more complicated bilateral cases follow afterwards. Each section starts with a discussion of the rule of no liability before moving on to various forms of negligence and ending with various strict liability rules. At the end of each section, there is a discussion on how results change when relaxing specific assumptions. The various aspects are summarised focusing on the question of whether the outcome under a specific liability regime is efficient or not. We also discuss several more specific topics of interest, for example, the information generating consequence of negligence, the allocative effects of various liability rules when agents enter into a contractual relationship, product liability, cases of ‘joint liability’, the impact of uncertain legal standards, and the interaction between liability law and insurance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Negligence, Strict Liability

JEL Classification: K0

working papers series


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Date posted: May 20, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Schäfer, Hans-Bernd and Mueller-Langer, Frank, Strict Liability Versus Negligence (2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2062787 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2062787

Contact Information

Hans-Bernd Schaefer (Contact Author)
Bucerius Law School ( email )
Jungiusstr. 6
Hamburg, 20355
Germany
University of Hamburg ( email )
Allende-Platz 1
Hamburg, 20146
Germany
Frank Mueller-Langer
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law ( email )
Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.ip.mpg.de/en/pub/academic_body/acad_staff/frank_mueller-langer.cfm

International Max Planck Research School for Competition and Innovation (IMPRS-CI) ( email )
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.imprs-ci.ip.mpg.de/en/pub/news.cfm?varnews=47356
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