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Adverse Possession, Takings, and the State


William Marra


Harvard Law School

May 19, 2012

University of Detroit Mercy Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 1, 2011

Abstract:     
Normally, the government may not seize private land without paying for that land. Yet it turns out that governmental bodies sometimes avail themselves of the laws of adverse possession, taking title to private land without paying the landowner. This phenomenon, largely ignored by the scholarly literature, raises two questions. First, should the government be allowed to adversely possess land in the same manner as private individuals? Second, when the government commits adverse possession, does this constitute a constitutional “taking” that requires the payment of just compensation? These two questions are of practical importance because they affect the resolution of numerous property claims, and they are of theoretical significance because they implicate both the appropriate scope of private property rights and the proper relationship between the individual and the state.

Part I provides an introduction to adverse possession, and Part II studies the law of government adverse possession, detailing how nearly every jurisdiction permits the government to adversely possess private land in the same manner as private individuals. But as Part III demonstrates, government adverse possessors are not similarly situated to private adverse possessors, and the laws of adverse possession are built on a trio of assumptions — that the landowner has a property rule entitlement to her land, that the trespasser develops robust reliance interests, and that society’s primary interest is in quieting title — that do not necessarily hold when the government is the adverse possessor. Part IV concludes that because the current rules of adverse possession incentivize government trespass upon private land, special rules should apply to the government. When the government adverse possessor trespassed in good faith, a longer statute of limitations should apply; when the government trespassed in bad faith, it should be entirely denied the right to adverse possession.

One quick fix to the problem, proposed by a federal court and endorsed by some commentators, is to call government adverse possession a constitutional taking and require the state to pay just compensation. Part V explains that the problem cannot so easily be wished away, and contends that the text of the Constitution, its history, and Supreme Court precedent all suggest that government adverse possession is not a taking. The solution to the problem presented by government adverse possession rests in righting property law, not distorting constitutional law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: Property, Adverse Possession, Takings, Eminent Domain, Government, State, Easement

JEL Classification: K11

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Date posted: May 21, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Marra, William, Adverse Possession, Takings, and the State (May 19, 2012). University of Detroit Mercy Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 1, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2062856

Contact Information

William Marra (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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