Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2064144
 


 



Why Do Investors Trade?


Eric K. Kelley


University of Tennessee; University of Arizona

Paul C. Tetlock


Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics

May 1, 2013


Abstract:     
We propose and estimate a structural model of daily stock market activity to test competing theories of trading volume. The model features informed rational speculators and uninformed agents who trade either to hedge endowment shocks or to speculate on perceived information. To identify the model parameters, we exploit enormous empirical variation in trading volume, market liquidity, and return volatility associated with regular and extended-hours markets as well as news arrival. We find that the model matches market activity well when we allow for overconfidence. At plausible values of overconfidence and risk aversion, overconfidence--not hedging--explains nearly all uninformed trading, while rational informed speculation accounts for most overall trading. Without overconfident investors, over 99% of trading volume disappears even when informed rational traders disagree maximally. These findings illustrate that modest overconfidence can help explain stark patterns in stock market activity.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 65

Keywords: structural estimation, overconfidence, news arrival, extended hours

JEL Classification: G12, G14

working papers series





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Date posted: May 22, 2012 ; Last revised: May 21, 2013

Suggested Citation

Kelley, Eric K. and Tetlock, Paul C., Why Do Investors Trade? (May 1, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2064144 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2064144

Contact Information

Eric K. Kelley
University of Tennessee ( email )
Knoxville, TN 37996
United States
University of Arizona ( email )
McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
520-621-5589 (Phone)
Paul C. Tetlock (Contact Author)
Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-9895 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/ptetlock/

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