Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=206448
 
 

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Citations (638)



 
 

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The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations


Stijn Claessens


International Monetary Fund (IMF); University of Amsterdam - Finance Group; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Tinbergen Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Simeon Djankov


New Economic School (NES)

Larry H.P. Lang


The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance

November 23, 1999


Abstract:     
We examine the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries. In all countries, voting rights frequently exceed cash-flow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings. The separation of ownership and control is most pronounced among family-controlled firms and small firms. More than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a single shareholder. Managers of closely held firms tend to be relatives of the controlling shareholder's family. Older firms are generally family-controlled, dispelling the notion that ownership becomes dispersed over time. Finally, significant corporate wealth in East Asia is concentrated among a few families.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

JEL Classification: G34

working papers series


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Date posted: May 23, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Claessens, Stijn and Djankov, Simeon and Lang, Larry H.P., The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations (November 23, 1999). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=206448 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.206448

Contact Information

Stijn Claessens
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-7641 (Phone)
202-5897641 (Fax)
University of Amsterdam - Finance Group ( email )
Roetersstraat 18
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 6020 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5285 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.fee.uva.nl/fm/index.htm
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Simeon Djankov (Contact Author)
New Economic School (NES) ( email )
47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
Moscow, 117418
Russia
HOME PAGE: http://www.nes.ru
Hsien Ping Larry Lang
The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance ( email )
Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
+85 2 2609 7761 (Phone)
+85 2 2603 6586 (Fax)
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References:  44
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