The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB); University of Amsterdam - Finance Group; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Tinbergen Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics
Larry H.P. Lang
The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance
November 23, 1999
We examine the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries. In all countries, voting rights frequently exceed cash-flow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings. The separation of ownership and control is most pronounced among family-controlled firms and small firms. More than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a single shareholder. Managers of closely held firms tend to be relatives of the controlling shareholder's family. Older firms are generally family-controlled, dispelling the notion that ownership becomes dispersed over time. Finally, significant corporate wealth in East Asia is concentrated among a few families.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 47
JEL Classification: G34
Date posted: May 23, 2000
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