Fourteenth Amendment Originalism
Columbia University - Law School
May 24, 2012
Maryland Law Review, Forthcoming
Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 12-311
This essay, part of a symposium on Jack Balkin's Constitutional Redemption and Sanford Levinson's Constitutional Faith, seeks to explain the curious disregard many originalists show toward the Fourteenth Amendment. On common originalist premises, analysis of the text, history, and structure of the Fourteenth Amendment should predominate in discussions of incorporated rights, in affirmative action cases, and in federalism disputes, and yet originalist interventions into such discussions tend to minimize the amendment and Reconstruction-era history more generally. This essay suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment and Reconstruction represent less usable history than the Founding for several reasons: the Reconstruction amendments were largely failures in their own time; the open-ended language of the Fourteenth Amendment is not well-suited to settlement of modern controversies; and the Reconstruction era holds an awkward and contested place within our national memory. These limitations are consistent with the notion that originalism in practice is as much an ethical as a hermeneutic project.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35
Keywords: originalism, Fourteenth Amendment, living constitutionalism, ReconstructionAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 25, 2012 ; Last revised: July 24, 2012
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