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Prudential Policy for PeggersStephanie Schmitt-GrohéColumbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Martin UribeColumbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) May 2012 CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8961 Abstract: This paper shows that in a small open economy model with downward nominal wage rigidity pegging the nominal exchange rate creates a negative pecuniary externality. This peg-induced externality is shown to cause unemployment, overborrowing, and depressed levels of consumption. The paper characterizes the optimal capital control policy and shows that it is prudential in nature. For it restricts capital inflows in good times and subsidizes external borrowing in bad times. Under plausible calibrations of the model, this type of macro prudential policy is shown to lower the average unemployment rate by 10 percentage points, reduce average external debt by more than 50 percent, and increase welfare by over 7 percent of consumption per period.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34 Keywords: capital controls, currency pegs, downward wage rigidity, pecuniary externality JEL Classification: E31, E62, F41 working papers seriesDate posted: May 25, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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