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Prudential Policy for Peggers


Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé


Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Martin Uribe


Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

May 2012

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8961

Abstract:     
This paper shows that in a small open economy model with downward nominal wage rigidity pegging the nominal exchange rate creates a negative pecuniary externality. This peg-induced externality is shown to cause unemployment, overborrowing, and depressed levels of consumption. The paper characterizes the optimal capital control policy and shows that it is prudential in nature. For it restricts capital inflows in good times and subsidizes external borrowing in bad times. Under plausible calibrations of the model, this type of macro prudential policy is shown to lower the average unemployment rate by 10 percentage points, reduce average external debt by more than 50 percent, and increase welfare by over 7 percent of consumption per period.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: capital controls, currency pegs, downward wage rigidity, pecuniary externality

JEL Classification: E31, E62, F41

working papers series


Date posted: May 25, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie and Uribe, Martin, Prudential Policy for Peggers (May 2012). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8961. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2066334

Contact Information

Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé (Contact Author)
Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics ( email )
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Martin Uribe
Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics ( email )
420 W. 118th Street
1022 International Affairs Building, MC 3308
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-851-4008 (Phone)
212-854-8059 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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