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The Theory of Minds Within the Theory of GamesMathew D. McCubbinsUniversity of Southern California - Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law and the Department of Political Science Mark B. TurnerCase Western Reserve University - Department of Cognitive Science Nicholas WellerUniversity of Southern California - Department of Political Science; University of Southern California - School of International Relations May 25, 2012 Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2012 Abstract: Classical rationality as accepted by game theory assumes that a human chooser in a given moment has consistent preferences and beliefs and that actions result consistently from those preferences and beliefs, and moreover that these preferences, beliefs, and actions remain the same across equal choice moments. Since, as is widely found in prior experiments, subjects do not follow the predictions of classical rationality, behavioral game theorists have assumed consistent deviations from classical rationality by assigning to subjects certain dispositions — risk preference, cognitive abilities, social norms, etc. All of these theories are fundamentally cognitive theories, making claims about how individual human minds work when choosing. All of them are fundamentally wrong in assuming one kind of consistency or another. Or at least, all of the proposals for consistency in belief, preference, and action with which we are aware turn out to be wrong when tested experimentally
Number of Pages in PDF File: 7 Keywords: Behavioral game theory, experiments, cognition, Trust, Dictator, Donation, Prediction Markets JEL Classification: C7, C72, C9, C91 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: May 25, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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