Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=206688
 
 

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Who Counts Morally?


Eric D. Blumenson


Suffolk University Law School


Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 14

Abstract:     
According to the human rights claim, every human being has a moral status that other entities--like rocks or plants--do not. No matter how weak, despised or criminal, every person is owed consideration and, with regard to her most vital interests, deference.

On one account, human beings count morally in this way because they are created in the image of God, and thus the human rights claim is necessarily a religious one. This paper considers whether there is an alternative secular explanation of what it is about every human being that demands moral respect--and if so, whether this attribute is shared with other beings as well.

After considering three possible secular accounts--derived respectively from the intuitionist, utilitarian and Kantian traditions--the paper proposes a fourth, alternative theory according to which all sentient beings count morally. As to human beings in particular, the paper concludes that they are morally entitled to certain rights simply in virtue of their interests as sentient beings, and others in virtue of additional morally relevant characteristics peculiar to human beings, such as rationality and self-consciousness.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

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Date posted: March 19, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Blumenson, Eric D., Who Counts Morally?. Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 14. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=206688 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.206688

Contact Information

Eric Blumenson (Contact Author)
Suffolk University Law School ( email )
120 Tremont Street
Boston, MA 02108-4977
United States
(617) 305-1967 (Phone)
(617) 305-3087 (Fax)
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