Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2066998
 


 



Does Immigration into Their Neighborhoods Incline Voters Toward the Extreme Right? The Case of the Freedom Party of Austria


Martin Halla


University of Innsbruck - Department of Public Finance

Alexander F. Wagner


University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swiss Finance Institute

Josef Zweimüller


University of Zurich - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)


IZA Discussion Paper No. 6575

Abstract:     
This paper explores one potentially important channel through which immigration may drive support for extreme right-wing parties: the presence of immigrants in one's neighborhood. We study the case of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Under the leadership of Jörg Haider, this party increased its share of votes from less than 5 percent in the early 1980s to 27 percent by the year 1999. Using past regional settlement patterns as a source of exogenous variation, we find a significantly positive effect of the residential proximity of immigrants on FPÖ votes, explaining roughly a quarter of the cross-community variance in FPÖ votes. It is the presence of low- and medium-skilled immigrants that drives this result; high-skilled immigrants have no (or even a negative) effect on FPÖ votes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: immigration, political economy, voting

JEL Classification: P16, J61


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Date posted: May 26, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Halla, Martin and Wagner, Alexander F. and Zweimüller, Josef, Does Immigration into Their Neighborhoods Incline Voters Toward the Extreme Right? The Case of the Freedom Party of Austria. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6575. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2066998

Contact Information

Martin Halla (Contact Author)
University of Innsbruck - Department of Public Finance ( email )
Innrain 52
Innsbruck, 6020
Austria
Alexander F. Wagner
University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance ( email )
Plattenstrasse 14
Zürich, 8032
Switzerland
+41 44 634 3963 (Phone)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Swiss Finance Institute ( email )
Switzerland
HOME PAGE: http://www.alex-wagner.com
Josef Zweimueller
University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )
Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland
+411 634 3724 (Phone)
+411 634 4907 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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