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Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment Among Students and Clerical WorkersMaria BigoniUniversity of Bologna - Department of Economics Gabriele CameraEconomics Science Institute, Chapman University; WWZ, University of Basel Marco CasariUniversity of Bologna - Department of Economics May 28, 2012 Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 828 Abstract: We study individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly faced with the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategies adopted, and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers, and cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior with decentralized punishment and also personal punishment when available.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43 Keywords: non-standard subject pools, prisoner’s dilemma, personal punishment, artefactual field experiment, stranger matching JEL Classification: C90, C70, D80 working papers seriesDate posted: May 29, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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