Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2071397
 


 



The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem


Lucian E. Dervan


Southern Illinois University School of Law

Vanessa Edkins


Florida Institute of Technology

May 31, 2012

103 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1, 2013

Abstract:     
In 1989, Ada JoAnn Taylor was accused of murder and presented with stark options. If she pleaded guilty, she would be rewarded with a sentence of ten to forty years in prison. If, however, she proceeded to trial and was convicted, she would likely spend the rest of her life behind bars. Over a thousand miles away in Florida and more than twenty years later, a college student was accused of cheating and presented with her own incentives to admit wrongdoing and save the university the time and expense of proceeding before a disciplinary review board. Both women decided the incentives were enticing and pleaded guilty.

That Taylor and the college student both pleaded guilty is not the only similarity between the cases. Both were also innocent of the offenses for which they had been accused. After serving nineteen years in prison, Taylor was exonerated after DNA testing proved that neither she nor any of the other five defendants who pleaded guilty in her case were involved in the murder. As for the college student, her innocence is assured by the fact that, unbeknownst to her, she was actually part of an innovative new study into plea bargaining and innocence.

This article discusses the study, which involved dozens of college students and took place over several months. The study revealed that more than half of the innocent participants were willing to falsely admit guilt in return for a benefit. These research findings bring significant new insights to the long-standing debate regarding the extent of plea bargaining’s innocence problem. The article also discusses the history of bargained justice and examines the constitutional implications of the study’s results on plea bargaining, an institution the Supreme Court reluctantly approved in 1970 in return for an assurance it would not be used to induce innocent defendants to falsely admit guilt.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 49

Keywords: plea bargaining, innocence, empirical study, psychological study, criminal law, criminal procedure, constitutional law

JEL Classification: K00, K10, K14, K30, K40, K42

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: May 31, 2012 ; Last revised: June 25, 2014

Suggested Citation

Dervan, Lucian E. and Edkins, Vanessa, The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem (May 31, 2012). 103 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1, 2013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2071397 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2071397

Contact Information

Lucian E. Dervan (Contact Author)
Southern Illinois University School of Law ( email )
Lesar Law Building
Carbondale, IL 62901
United States
Vanessa Edkins
Florida Institute of Technology ( email )
150 West University Blvd.
Melbourne, FL 32901-6975
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 7,798
Downloads: 1,288
Download Rank: 7,682

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.453 seconds