Abstract

 
 

References (66)



 


 



Corruption Distance and Foreign Direct Investment


Xingwang Qian


SUNY Buffalo State

Jesus Sandoval-Hernandez


University of California, Santa Cruz - Economics Department

J.Z. Garrett


Hampden-Sydney College - Ecomonics and Business Department

May 28, 2012


Abstract:     
We study the effects of “corruption distance,” defined as the difference in corruption levels between country pairs, on bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a “gravity” model and the Heckman (1979) two-stage framework on a data set of 45 countries from 1997 to 2007, we find that corruption distance adversely affects the volume of FDI to be invested in a host country. However, we do not find statistical evidence that corruption distance influences FDI’s decision on whether to invest or not. The volume reduction effect of corruption distance varies across different source-host-country-pair samples. Further, we identify the asymmetric effect of corruption distance and find that the positive corruption distance, defined as the corruption distance from a high corruption source to a low corruption host country, is the prominent one that affects the behavior of bilateral FDI. Again, the degree of such asymmetric effect varies across different country-pair samples.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: foreign direct investment, corruption, developing countries

JEL Classification: F21, F23, F59, O5

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: June 4, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Qian, Xingwang, Sandoval-Hernandez, Jesus and Garrett, J.Z., Corruption Distance and Foreign Direct Investment (May 28, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2076759 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2076759

Contact Information

Xingwang Qian (Contact Author)
SUNY Buffalo State ( email )
Classroom BLDG B232
1300 Elmwood Ave
Buffalo, NY 14222
United States
716-878-6031 (Phone)
716-878-6907 (Fax)
Jesus Sandoval-Hernandez
University of California, Santa Cruz - Economics Department ( email )
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States
831- 459-5201 (Phone)
J.Z. Garrett
Hampden-Sydney College - Ecomonics and Business Department
Hampden-Sydney, VA
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 278
Downloads: 57
Download Rank: 188,321
References:  66

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.313 seconds