Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2079131
 
 

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Shareholder Activism and Political Spending


Vishal P. Baloria


Boston College

Kenneth J. Klassen


University of Waterloo - School of Accounting and Finance

Christine I. Wiedman


University of Waterloo

May 15, 2014

CAAA Annual Conference 2013

Abstract:     
We examine the determinants and consequences of shareholder activism around corporate political spending using a sample of political spending shareholder proposals from 2004 and 2012. Proposals calling for enhanced disclosure of spending information are most prevalent and garner the most votes relative to those calling for information on spending philosophy or say on political spending. We find that 20% of the proposals are subsequently adopted, a rate that is high relative to previous studies. Further, we find that while unions and pension funds appear to target firms for private interests, voting patterns and market reaction to implementation decisions reflect a more sophisticated understanding of political spending and an ability to filter out opportunism on the part of activists/management. Our findings contribute to the ongoing debate about the role of disclosure and shareholder voice in an era where firms face fewer restrictions in directing corporate funds towards political spending.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 57

Keywords: disclosure, political spending, shareholder proposals

JEL Classification: M41, G38, D72

working papers series





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Date posted: June 7, 2012 ; Last revised: August 13, 2014

Suggested Citation

Baloria, Vishal P. and Klassen, Kenneth J. and Wiedman, Christine I., Shareholder Activism and Political Spending (May 15, 2014). CAAA Annual Conference 2013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2079131 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2079131

Contact Information

Vishal P. Baloria (Contact Author)
Boston College ( email )
140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
647-883-6469 (Phone)
Kenneth Klassen
University of Waterloo - School of Accounting and Finance ( email )
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1
Canada
519-888-4567 x38550 (Phone)
519-888-7562 (Fax)
Christine I. Wiedman
University of Waterloo ( email )
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1
Canada
519-888-4567 x.3732 (Phone)
519-888-7562 (Fax)
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