The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception
Roger Paul Alford
Notre Dame Law School
June 7, 2012
2011 Utah Law Review 697
Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 2079608
This Article analyzes the WTO security exception, with a particular focus on State practice. In the absence of any GATT or WTO jurisprudence, State practice affords the best vehicle to understand the meaning of Article XXI. In the few instances when invocation of the security exception has been challenged, State practice suggests that the security exception is not judicially reviewable.
A critical question emerges from this analysis of State practice. If a Member State can avoid WTO obligations through a self-judging security exception, what is to prevent bad faith invocations? The WTO regime includes a number of devices to address this concern, including opting out of normal trade relations, opting in to deeper trade relations, granting preferential treatment to developing countries consistent with security interests, and protecting against the nullification or impairment of Member States’ legitimate expectations even in the absence of a WTO violation. These arrangements provide broad discretion to act in furtherance of the national interest without violating trade rules. As such, Member States quite often can advance national objectives without the need to invoke the security exception.
Notwithstanding these mitigating factors, a self-judging security exception poses grave risks. If abused, it could undermine the entire WTO regime. But the practice of WTO Member States is to invoke the security exception in good faith, with a margin of discretion. A Member State may do so because of a fear of sanction, out of a sense of norm legitimacy, or because it is in its self-interest to do so.
The Article concludes with brief reflections on why nations comply with the good faith obligation of a self-judging exception. Compliance with a self-judging rule offers useful insights into larger questions of why nations obey international law. Rational choice and normative theories best explain compliance with a self-judging international norm.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 63
Keywords: WTO, GATT, National Security, International Law Compliance, BITs
JEL Classification: K33Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: June 9, 2012
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.266 seconds