Abstract

 


 



On the Optimal Type and Level of Guarantees for Prospect Theory Investors


Sebastian Ebert


University of Bonn

Birgit Koos


University of Bonn - Department of Economics

Judith C. Schneider


University of Muenster - Finance Center Muenster

June 11, 2012

Paris December 2012 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI-AFFI Paper

Abstract:     
It is well known that cumulative prospect theory (CPT) can explain a demand for guarantees in investment products. This observation motivates us to study what type of guarantee observed in real{world insurance markets is most attractive to CPT investors. We nd that CPT investors favor a simple terminal wealth guarantee compared to more complex ratchet and cliquet guarantees. To obtain this result we determine the optimal speci cations of these contracts to CPT investors by means of an extensive simulation study. Optimization further allows to study the desired guarantee level (which is determined endogeneously from preferences), and illustrates what elements of CPT drive the demand for guarantees. CPT investors either desire a guarantee level equal to their reference point or insurance against large losses only. Such a crash insurance can be explained by probability weighting alone, i.e., even in the absence of loss aversion.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: Behavioral Insurance, Guarantee Contracts, Prospect Theory

JEL Classification: G02, G11, G13

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Date posted: June 12, 2012 ; Last revised: December 12, 2012

Suggested Citation

Ebert, Sebastian, Koos, Birgit and Schneider, Judith C., On the Optimal Type and Level of Guarantees for Prospect Theory Investors (June 11, 2012). Paris December 2012 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI-AFFI Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2081665 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2081665

Contact Information

Sebastian Ebert
University of Bonn ( email )
Institute for Financial Economics and Statistics
Adenauerallee 24 -42
Bonn, D-53113
Germany
Birgit Koos
University of Bonn - Department of Economics ( email )
Adenauerallee 24-42
D-53113 Bonn
Germany
0049-228-739229 (Phone)
0049-228-735048 (Fax)
Judith C. Schneider (Contact Author)
University of Muenster - Finance Center Muenster ( email )
Universitatsstr. 14-16
Muenster, 48143
Germany
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