Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2082882
 


 



Google, in the Aftermath of Microsoft and Intel: The Right Approach to Antitrust Enforcement in Innovative High Tech Platform Markets?


Fernando Diez


Centro Universitario Villanueva

June 12, 2012


Abstract:     
Antitrust enforcement efforts both in Europe and the United States have recently increased in number of actions taken and the amount of fines imposed in high-tech industries. Recent decisions in this field have rekindled in-depth and largely unresolved debates concerning the appropriate role of antitrust enforcement in such markets. As it happened with Microsoft and Intel, and it’s expected to happen soon against closely related companies – in terms of business model – such as Google, enforcement efforts in both sides of the Atlantic raise the same fundamental issues concerning the effectiveness of competition policy in dynamically competitive industries. The debate is the same, although, as we shall see, the results are totally different outcomes. This sort of high tech markets are usually characterised for a heavy reliance in ICT (information and communication technologies), the importance of product design and the development of platforms. Question is, does current antitrust enforcement in these specific markets achieve its goal of fostering competition or rather the undesired effect of chilling innovation?

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: antitrust, innovation, Google, Microsoft, INTEL, high tech markets

JEL Classification: B40, B41, K00, K21, L10, L40, L41, L42, O38

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: June 12, 2012 ; Last revised: August 28, 2012

Suggested Citation

Diez, Fernando, Google, in the Aftermath of Microsoft and Intel: The Right Approach to Antitrust Enforcement in Innovative High Tech Platform Markets? (June 12, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2082882 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2082882

Contact Information

Fernando Diez (Contact Author)
Centro Universitario Villanueva ( email )
C/ Claudio Coello 11
Barrio de Salamanca
Madrid, 28001
Spain
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,344
Downloads: 301
Download Rank: 56,065
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.547 seconds