CEO Compensation and Board Structure – Rejoinder
College of William and Mary - Mason School of Business
Hong Kong Polytechnic University
April 18, 2012
In their reply to our critique, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2012) suggest that (i) Apple is a prime example of how board regulations affect CEO pay and should therefore not be excluded from the study, and (ii) their original results are robust to excluding the outliers when extending the pre-event sample period from 2000 to 2002 back to 1996. In this rejoinder, we (i) dispute that Apple is a fitting example to illustrate the causal effect of board independence on CEO pay, (ii) caution against drawing conclusions about the robustness of the results from the new regression results in the reply (e.g., due to lack of relevance, sample selection issues, and more outlier effects), and (iii) argue that important omissions in the reply cast further doubt on the conclusions advocated by CG. In a nutshell, the existing evidence simply does not support the view that mandated board independence helps rein in executive compensation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
Keywords: Executive Compensation, CEO Pay, Managerial Power, Board Structure, Board Independence, Corporate Governance, Compensation Committee, Sarbanes-Oxley, NYSE, Nasdaq
JEL Classification: G34, G38, J31, J33working papers series
Date posted: June 16, 2012
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.578 seconds