Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2084690
 


 



Estimating Damages from Price-Fixing - The Value of Transaction Data


Kai Hüschelrath


Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Kathrin Mueller


Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Tobias Veith


Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

2012

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-036

Abstract:     
We use a unique private data set of about 340,000 invoice positions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the value of such transaction data for an estimation of cartel damages. In particular, we investigate, first, how structural break analysis can be used to identify the exact end of the cartel agreement and, second, how an application of before-and-after approaches to estimate the price overcharge can benefit from such rich data sets. We conclude that transaction data allows such a detailed assessment of the cartel and its impact on direct customers that its regular application in private antitrust cases is desired as long as data collection and preparation procedures are not prohibitively expensive.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Antitrust policy, private enforcement, cartels, overcharge, damages, cement

JEL Classification: L41, L61, K21

working papers series


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Date posted: June 16, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Hüschelrath, Kai and Mueller, Kathrin and Veith, Tobias, Estimating Damages from Price-Fixing - The Value of Transaction Data (2012). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-036. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2084690 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2084690

Contact Information

Kai Hüschelrath (Contact Author)
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )
P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany
Kathrin Mueller
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )
P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany
Tobias Veith
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )
P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany
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