Gender Differences in Bargaining Outcomes: A Field Experiment on Discrimination

36 Pages Posted: 18 Jun 2012

See all articles by Marco Castillo

Marco Castillo

Department of Economics, Texas A&M University; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Ragan Petrie

Texas A&M University - Department of Economics; University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research

Maximo Torero

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

Lise Vesterlund

University of Pittsburgh - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2012

Abstract

We examine gender differences in bargaining outcomes in a highly competitive and commonly used market: the taxi market in Lima, Peru. Examining the entire path of negotiation we find that men face higher initial prices and rejection rates. These differentials are consistent with both statistical and taste-based discrimination. To identify the source of the inferior treatment of men we conduct an experiment where passengers send a signal on valuation before negotiating. The signal eliminates gender differences and the response is shown only to be consistent with statistical discrimination. Our study secures identification within the market or interest and demonstrates that there are environments where sophisticated statistical inference is the sole source of differential gender outcomes.

Keywords: barganing, discrimination, statistical inference, gender

JEL Classification: C93, J16, C78

Suggested Citation

Castillo, Marco and Petrie, Ragan and Torero, Maximo and Torero, Maximo and Vesterlund, Lise, Gender Differences in Bargaining Outcomes: A Field Experiment on Discrimination (March 2012). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 12-30, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2087134 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2087134

Marco Castillo (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, Texas A&M University ( email )

Allen Building
4228 TAMU
College Station, TX 77843-3137
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IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
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Germany

Ragan Petrie

Texas A&M University - Department of Economics ( email )

4228 TAMU
College Station, TX 77843-4228
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.raganpetrie.org/

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research ( email )

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Parkville, Victoria 3010
Australia

Maximo Torero

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) ( email )

1201 Eye St, NW,
Washington, DC 20005
United States

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) ( email )

1201 Eye St, NW,
Washington, DC 20005
United States

Lise Vesterlund

University of Pittsburgh - Department of Economics ( email )

4T18 WW Posvar. Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/vesterlund/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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