Abstract

 


 



Facing a Dilemma: Cooperative Behavior and Beauty


Donja Darai


University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Silvia Grätz


University of Zurich - Department of Economics

December 7, 2012

University of Zurich Department of Economics Working Paper No. 82

Abstract:     
This paper investigates the influence of physical attractiveness on cooperative be- havior. We survey data from 211 episodes of a television game show and combine it with independent facial attractiveness ratings of the show's contestants. The final of the show represents a simultaneous one-shot modified prisoner's dilemma. Our results show that facially attractive contestants provoke cooperative behavior from their counterparts, but attractive contestants themselves do not behave differently from unattractive ones. This preferential treatment or "beauty premium" rewards attractive contestants with substantially higher monetary gains of up to £2 153. This finding applies to both sexes. But, the attractiveness effect is limited to mixed-gender interactions. Contestants are only more cooperative when facing an attractive fellow player of the opposite sex. Attractiveness also has no effect in group-decisions made by the contestants prior to the prisoner's dilemma. Therefore people seem to show a preference to cooperate with someone towards whom they are personally attracted; and this preference reaches full effect when people lack other information on which to base their decision.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Beauty premium, cooperation, prisoner's dilemma

JEL Classification: C71, D83, Z13

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Date posted: June 19, 2012 ; Last revised: December 11, 2012

Suggested Citation

Darai, Donja and Grätz, Silvia, Facing a Dilemma: Cooperative Behavior and Beauty (December 7, 2012). University of Zurich Department of Economics Working Paper No. 82. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2087601 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2087601

Contact Information

Donja Darai (Contact Author)
University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )
Bluemlisalpstrasse 10
Zurich, 8006
Switzerland
Silvia Grätz
University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )
Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland
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