Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2087793
 


 



Inside-Out Enforcement


Lisa Kern Griffin


Duke University - School of Law

April 18, 2011

PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT, p. 110, Anthony S. Barkow, Rachel E. Barkow, eds., NYU Press, April 2011

Abstract:     
This chapter for a volume on "Prosecutors in the Boardroom" explores the collaboration between public criminal enforcers and private corporate actors, and some costs and benefits of those partnerships. When the government outsources investigative functions in corporate fraud cases -- such as employee interviews, forensic accounting, and compliance monitoring -- the boundaries between public and private roles can blur. There are advantages to that strategy given resource constraints and the complexity of corporate criminal investigations, but it also tends to exacerbate the piecemeal nature of enforcement. Furthermore, reliance on the private sector imports one of the most problematic features of regulatory relationships into criminal adjudication: the potential for self-dealing.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: Corporate Crime, Federal Criminal Law, Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Regulatory Enforcement

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: June 23, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Griffin, Lisa Kern, Inside-Out Enforcement (April 18, 2011). PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT, p. 110, Anthony S. Barkow, Rachel E. Barkow, eds., NYU Press, April 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2087793

Contact Information

Lisa Kern Griffin (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Duke School of Law
Durham, NC 27708
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 206
Downloads: 38

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.265 seconds