Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2088744
 
 

References (42)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Identity, Homophily and In-Group Bias


Sergio Currarini


University of Leicester - Department of Economics; Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics

Friederike Mengel


Maastricht University

June 21, 2012

FEEM Working Paper No. 37.2012

Abstract:     
Many Social Interactions display either or both of the following well documented phenomena. People tend to interact with similar others (homophily). And they tend to treat others more favorably if they are perceived to share the same identity (in-group bias). While both phenomena involve some degree of discrimination towards others, a systematic study of their relations and interplay is yet missing. In this paper we report the findings of an experiment designed to address this issue. Participants are exogenously and randomly assigned to one of two groups. Subsequently they play a sequence of eight games with either an in-group or an out-group member. Wend strong evidence of in-group bias when agents are matched exogenously. When agents can affect who they are matched with, we find strong evidence of homophily. However, in-group biases either decrease or disappear altogether under endogenous matching. Self selection of homophilous agents into in-group matches alone cannot explain this fact. We also show that homophily is strongly correlated with risk aversion, and we use this fact to provide an explanation for both the existence of homophily and the disappearance of in-group biases under endogenous matching.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: in-group bias, homophily, endogenous matching, experiments, game theory

JEL Classification: D03, D01, C91, C92, C7

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: June 21, 2012 ; Last revised: February 14, 2013

Suggested Citation

Currarini, Sergio and Mengel, Friederike, Identity, Homophily and In-Group Bias (June 21, 2012). FEEM Working Paper No. 37.2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2088744 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2088744

Contact Information

Sergio Currarini (Contact Author)
University of Leicester - Department of Economics ( email )
Department of Economics
Leicester LE1 7RH, LE1 7RH
United Kingdom
Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics ( email )
Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy
Friederike Mengel
Maastricht University ( email )
Maastricht
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 323
Downloads: 63
Download Rank: 207,503
References:  42
Citations:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.328 seconds