Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games

Karos, Dominik

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2088768

Abstract

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Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games

Dominik Karos

Saarland University

June 21, 2012

FEEM Working Paper No. 38.2012

Abstract:
The class of games with one apex player is generalized to the class of games with a collection of apex sets. These simple games, together with a power index, canonically induce a hedonic coalition formation game. A monotonicity property of solutions is introduced and its meaning for the induced hedonic game is analyzed. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of core stable partitions are stated and core stable partitions are characterized.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: apex games, core stability, hedonic games, strong monotonicity

JEL Classification: C71

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Date posted: June 21, 2012

Suggested Citation

Karos, Dominik, Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games (June 21, 2012). FEEM Working Paper No. 38.2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2088768 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2088768

Contact Information

Dominik Karos (Contact Author)

Saarland University ( email )

P.O. Box 151150
D-66041 Saarbruecken
Germany